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CHAPTER 6 
Workmen's Compensation 
LAURENCE S. LOCKE" 
§6.1. Personal Injury-Mental and Emotional Disorder Causally Re-
lated to Mental and Emotional Work Stress-Specific Stressful Work-
Related Episodes. During the Survey year two Massachusetts appellate 
courts considered whether a disabling mental illness causally related to 
mental or emotional work stress was a compensable injury. In Albanese's 
Case,! the Supreme Judicial Court held that "if an employee is incapaci-
tated by a mental or emotional disorder causally related to a series of 
speCific stressful work-related incidents, the employee is entitled to com-
pensation." 2 The Court did not consider whether an employee's mental 
disorder caused by the general stress of his working conditions should 
be compensable absent proof of specific stressful work-related incidents.s 
The distinction between these two potential causes of mental and emo-
tional disorder was emphasized in Camaioni's Case,4 where the Appeals 
Court remanded the case for the board to consider whether the em-
ployee's injury was caused or aggravated by "specific stressful work-
related incidents" or was simply the result of "the general stress of his 
working conditions." 5 
The test of compensability under the Massachusetts Workmen's Com-
pensation Act is whether the personal injury arose "out of and in the 
course of employment." 6 The term "personal injury," though not de-
fined comprehenSively in the act,7 has been interpreted to further the 
act's goal of providing employees relief for the personal injuries they 
" LAURENCE S. LOCKE is a partner in the Boston law finn of Petkun and 
Locke and is the author of the Massachusetts Practice Series volume on Workmen's 
Compensation. 
§6.1. ! 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1171, 389 N.E.2d 83. 
2 ld. at 1171-72, 389 N.E.2d at 84. 
sId. at 1176 n.4, 389 N.E.2d at 86 n.4. 
4 1979 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. 1147, 389 N.E.2d 1028. 
5 ld. at 1148, 389 N£.2d at 1029. 
6 C.L. c. 152, § 26. 
7 The definition appearing in § 1 imerted by chapter 437 of the Acts of 1941, 
providing that the tenn "includes" infectious or contagiOUS diseases under certain 
conditions, thereby only broadened the tenn's meaning. 
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sustain in the course of and arising out of their employment. 8 The term 
has been construed in the broadest possible language to include "what-
ever lesion or change in any part of the system produces harm or pain 
or a lessened facility in the natural use of any bodily activity or capa-
bility." 9 By requiring only a personal injury and not a "personal injury 
by accident," as was mandated by the English act and by the statutes of 
many other states, the Massachusetts act avoided many of the problems 
which plagued the administration of the compensation laws elsewhere. 
In Massachusetts the focus is on the harm to the employee and its 
oausal relation to the employment, not on an external physical event, 
localized as to time or place.10 
Given the broad construction placed upon the term "personal injury" 
and the absence of the restrictive language which appears in other com-
pensation acts, it is surprising that only in the last few years have the 
Commonwealth courts held that a mental or emotional disorder 11 re-
sulting from a mental or emotional stimulus at work may be a com-
pensable personal injury. As early as 1915, the Supreme Judicial Court 
recognized that mental and nervous disorders resulting from physical 
trauma were compensable under the act.12 By 1947 the Court had 
held that the physical trauma requirement of tort cases, mandated by 
Spade v. Lynn & Boston R. Co.p was not applicable to workmen's 
compensation.14 It thus allowed compensation for physical and organic 
disorders resulting from physioal trauma.10 It was expected that the 
Court would decide that mental injuries caused by mental stimulus are 
compensable because the Court already had held that mental illness or 
depression caused by physical injury was a personal injury. The Court 
also had stated that there was no distinction between stress resulting 
from physical exertion and stress "occasioned by distress, worry, fear, 
or anXiety." 16 In light of these decisions, this author had predicted in 
8 Fitzgibbons' Case, 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. 675, 680, 373 N.E.2d 1174, 1176-77. 
9 Burns' Case, 218 Mass. 8, 12, 105 N.E. 601, 603 (1914). 
10 29 MASSACHUSETTS PRACTICE, LOCKE, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 171 (2d 
ed. 1974). Chapter 9 contains a comprehensive discussion of personal injury and 
disease. 
11 In Albanese's Case, the Court noted that it was using the term "mental or 
emotional disorder" in a general sense and "intended neither to convey a precise 
medical meaning nor to provide in itself a basis for limitation or extension of the 
type of injury deemed compensable .... " 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1171 n.1, 389. 
N.E.2d at 84 n.1. 
12 These Supreme Judicial Court oases are collected in LOCKE, supra note 10, 
§ 196, at 234 n.79. 
13 168 Mass. 285, 47 N.E. 88 (1897). 
14 Charon's Case, 321 Mass. 694, 697, 75 N.E.2d 511, 513 (1947). 
15 Id. The cases ,are collected in LOCKE, supra note 10, § 196, at 234 n.80. 
16 McMurray's Case, 331 Mass. 29, 32, 116 N.E.2d 847, 849 (1954). 
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the first edition of his treatise that "one may confidently expect that 
the court will hold that a mental illness or depression brought about 
by distress, worry, fear, or anxiety ocoasioned by the employment is 
an equally compensable personal injury." 17 
Before the Court could render such an opinion in an appropriate 
case, the issue of whether to compensate mental injury caused by men-
tal stimulus was presented in Begin's Case.18 This case was based on 
an appeal from an award of compensation to a corrections officer who 
suffered from an acute anxiety state causally related to his three and 
one-half years experience guarding inmates in an institution for the 
criminally insane.19 The Court reversed the award of compensation and 
reached back to an old line of cases, never overruled, to hold that the 
claimant was suffering from "wear and tear" and not from a personal 
injury.20 
In the previous Survey year the Supreme Judicial Court finally had an 
opportunity, in Fitzgibbons' Case,21 to rule on the issue of mental or 
emotional incapacity resulting from mental stimulus. In Fitzgibbons a 
corrections officer, suffering from remorse at the death of an officer he 
had sent into a cell block to quell a disturbance, went into a deep 
depreSSion and committed suicide.22 Affirming the award of compen-
sation, the Court held that the term personal injury includes mental 
disturbances causally connected to mental trauma or shock arising out 
of the employment "looked at in any of its aspects." 23 The use of the 
language "looked at in any of its aspects" was encouragingly broad. 
It gave some hope that the Court might overrule Begin's Case, since 
the doctrine of wear and tear on which it relied was based on the out-
moded pre-CaswelL's Case 24 principle of "peculiar risk." 
17 LOCKE, supra note 10, § 196, at 235. 
18 354 Mass. 594, 238 N.E.2d 864 (1968). 
19 ld. at 595, 238 N.E.2d at 865. 
20 ld. Begin's Case was analyzed critically by this author in Locke, Workmen's 
Compensation, 1968 ANN. SURV. MASS. LAW 413, 415. It is also discussed in 
connection with an analysis of the "wear and tear" doctrine in LOCKE, supra note 
10, at § 175. 
21 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. 675, 373 N.E.2d 1174. 
22 ld. at 676-77, 373 N.E.2d at 1175-76. 
23 ld. at 680, 373 N.E.2d at 1177 (quoting Caswell's Case, 305 Mass. 500, 502, 
26 N.E.2d 328, 330 (1940». 
24 305 Mass. 500, 26 N.E.2d 328 (1940). The Court held that "[a]n injury 
arises out of the employment if it arises out of the nature, conditions, obligations 
or incidents of the employment." ld. at 502, 26 N.E.2d at 330. Compare this 
statement with the following from Maggelet's Case, 228 Mass. 57, 61, 116 N.E. 
972, 974 (1917). "A person may exhaust his physical or mental energies byexact-
ing toil, and become unfit for further service, but he is not because of this entitled 
to compensation, for the reason that this condition cannot fairly be described as 
a personal injury. The disease must be, or be traceable directly to, a personal 
injury peculiar to the employment." ld. (emphasis added). 
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An opportunity to overrule Begin's Case was soon presented when 
the Supreme Judicial Court considered the employee's appeal in Alba-
nese's Case. The Industrial Accident Board had denied the claim of a 
"working foreman" who developed a "chronic anxiety state mixed with 
depression and somatized reaction and ... neurocirculatory asthenia." 25 
This condition resulted from several emotionally stressful episodes in 
which Albanese had been humiliated by his employer in front of the 
workmen.26 The board found that his incapacity was causally related 
to these experiences but denied the claim as a matter of law,27 appar-
ently on the authority of Begin's Case.2S On appeal, the superior court 
reversed and concluded that Albanese was entitled to compensation un-
der chapter 152.29 The Supreme judicial Court, transferring the case 
sua sponte from the Appeals Court, affirmed the judgment of the su-
perior court. so 
If the case were considered as governed by Fitzgibbons' Case,S1 it 
would have presented no difficulty when heard on appeal in 1979. The 
insurer, however, regarded the case as governed by Begin's Case.S2 
The Court disagreed with the insurer's argument.33 Therefore, the 
main focus of the decision in Albanese was directed toward distinguish-
ing Begins Case.34 The Albanese Court regarded Begin's Case as hold-
ing only that a "disease of mind or body which arises in the course of 
employment, with nothing more, is not within the act." 35 Contrary to 
the insurer's argument that there was no evidence of "shock or stress 
greater than ordinary," S6 the board had found a series of specific stress-
ful episodes and a causal nexus between these working conditions and 
25 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1174, 389 N.E.2d at 85. 
26 ld. at 1173, 389 N.E.2d at 85. 
27 ld. at 1172, 389 N.E.2d at 84. 
28 354 Mass. 594, 238 N.E.2d 864 (1968). With characteristic accuracy, Justice 
Abrams points out that while the original decision of the reviewing board denied 
the claim on the authority of Begin's Case, the decision on recommital omitted 
reference to Begin. 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1175 n.3, 389 N.E.2d at 86 n.3. 
29 ld. at 1172, 389 N.E.2d at 84. 
30 ld. 
31 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. 675, 373 N.E.2d 1174. 
32 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1174-75, 389 N.E.2d at 85-86. 
33 ld. at 1176, 389 N.E.2d at 86. In a footnote Justice Abrams stated that 
~ere was no issue before the Court concerning whether an employee's mental 
dIsorder ?a~sed by the general stre~s of his working conditions is a compensable 
personal InJury absent proof of speCIfic stressful work-related incidents. The foot-
note cited decisions from other states on hoth sides of this issue and referred to 
1A A. LARSON, THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 42.23 (1973) [now 1B, 
§ 42.23]. The footnote also refers pointedly to Begin's Case. 1979 Mass. Adv. 
Sh. at 1176-77 nA, 389 N.E.2d at 86 nA. 
34 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1176, 389 N.E.2d at 86. 
S5 ld. 
S6 ld. at 1175-76, 389 N.E.2d at 86. 
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Albanese's emotional disorder.37 On this basis, the Court concluded 
that Albanese's disability was not occasioned by everyday stress or phys-
ical wear and tear resulting from a continuous period of hard work.as 
Rather, the Court observed that Albanese's injury was the result of a 
series of speCific stressful work-related incidents which arose during a 
relatively short period of time.39 Thus, the Court found that Begin's 
Case was inapplicable to the situation presented in Albanese.4o 
Although the Albanese Court's restrictive interpretation of Begin's 
Case weakens the impact of Begin, the Albanese decision appears to 
have given currency to the distinction between specific incident and 
general work-stress, if the rescript opinion of the Appeals Court in 
Camaioni's Case 41 is any indication. In Camaioni, <another correctional 
guard claimed a personal injury oaused by "[t]ension at work resulting 
in hypertenSion and question of heart condition." 42 The reviewing 
board denied the claim, concluding that the employee had not proven 
by a fair preponderance of the medical evidence that since May 27, 
1976, he has been disabled by a personal injury arising out of and in 
the course of his employment.43 Because there were no findings on any 
of the material issues raised by the claim, the court sent the case back 
to the board for reoonsideration in acoordance with Fitzgibbons' Case 
and Albanese's Case, both of which were decided after the reviewing 
board's decision.44 The rescript opinion concluded that in view of the 
recently decided cases in this area of the law, the board should con-
sider whether the employee's disability was occasioned or aggravated 
by "specific stressful work-related incidents" or was the result of "the 
general stress of his working conditions." 45 Thus, as the Appools Court 
viewed the issue of compensability for mental or emotional disorders 
produced by mental stimulus, if a plaintiff can show specific stressful 
work-related incidents, he may obtain compensation. If his mental or 
emotional disorder is the result of "the general stress of working con-
ditions," 46 he cannot. 
This is also how Massachusetts law is read elsewhere.47 This inter-
pretation, if based upon the decisions in Begin, Fitzgibbons, and Alba-
37 rd. at 1176, 389 N.E.2d at 86. 
3S rd. 
39 rd. 
40 rd. 
41 1979 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. 1147, 389 N.E.2d 1028. 
42 rd. 
43 rd. 
44 rd. at 1147-48, 389 N.E.2d at 1029. 
45 rd. at 1148, 389 N.E.2d at 1029. 
46 rd. 
47 1B A. LARSON, THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S CoMPENSATION § 42.23(b) n.93.4; 
Townsend v. Maine Bureau of Public Safety, 404 A.2d 1014, 1019 (Me. 1979). 
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nese, may be a fair reading. As one commentator has noted, however, 
the "distinction between sudden stimulus and gradual stimulus, limiting 
compensation to the former [is as] a matter of compensation ... un-
sound." 48 Massachusetts, with its broad definition of personal injury, 
does not apply the distinction to physioal injuries.4o The distinction 
between physical and mental injuries is equally unsound. 50 There is 
no satisfactory reason for Massachusetts to be considered one of the 
small group of states that limit mental injuries to cases of sudden 
stimulus or a series of specific stressful stimuli. It is suggested that 
too much has been read into these three cases and that the issue of 
compensation for gradual mental injury has yet to be decided in Mas-
sachusetts. Furthermore, it is likely that when the issue is squarely 
confronted, the liberal Massachusetts Court will adopt a construction 
which provides compensation for all disabilities, mental or physical, 
resulting from the employment considered in all of its aspects, whether 
the stress is mental or physical, sudden or gradual. 
Begin's Case cannot be regarded as settling the issue of compensa-
tion for gradual mental injury. It was not a careful and reasoned anal-
ysis of the problem. The decision side-stepped the issue by reaching 
back fifty years to apply to mental injuries a series of cases dealing 
with physical injuries arising from long years of unremitting toil. At 
the time these cases were decided they were without justification in 
compensation theory. Furthermore, they have since become outmoded 
by developments in compensation law arising between 1940 and 1968. 
Invited to reconsider the matter in Albanese's Case, the Court declined 
to do so, but clearly regarded the issue as open. 51 The Court specifi-
cally refused to address the issue of whether an employee's mental dis-
order causally related to the general pressures of his working environ-
ment is compensable as a personal injury absent further proof of specific 
stressful work-related incidents.52 
Unless the Court intends to disregard all our prior case law and draw 
distinctions between mental and phYSical injuries and between specific 
and cumulative injuries, it should not set special stringent rules limiting 
the compensability of mental or emotional disorders caused by mental 
48 LARSON, supra note 47, at § 42.23(b). 
49 Trombetta's Case, 1 Mass. App. 102, 294 N.E.2d 484 (1973); Brown's Case, 
334 Mass. 343, 135 N.E.2d 669 (1956); Harrington's Case, 285 Mass. 69, 188 
N.E. 489 (1933); LOCKE, supra note 10, at § 172 . 
. 50 McMurray's Case, 332 Mass. 29, 32, 116 N.E.2d 847, 849 (1954) (no dif-
ference between stress brought about by physical exertion and stress occasioned 
by distress, worry, fear or anxiety). 
51 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1176 n.4, 389 N.E.2d at 86 n.4. 
52 Id. 
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or emotional stress. Commentators have explained the special rules 
limiting compensability of mental injuries, sudden or gradual, as neces-
sary to avoid fraudulent and frivolous claims and to prevent the conver-
sion of the compensation act into a scheme of general health insurance.53 
The Supreme Judicial Court, however, has already answered this argu-
ment in the even more difficult area of tort claims for bystander injury. 
In Dziokonski v. Babineau,54 the Court noted its rejection of the fraud 
argument as justification for disallowing recovery for emotional distress 
where there is no proof of physical injury. 55 The Court rejected the 
difficulties of proof and the threat of fraud as absolute bars to recovery 
in all cases, because it believed that these dangers were matters for the 
consideration of the trier of fact. 50 An argument based on frivolous 
claims has even less merit under the workmen's compensation act, where 
cases are tried before an expert tribunal, well able to sift facts and weigh 
medical evidence. In addition, the possibility of a few fraudulent claims 
ought not to deny benefits, under a law infused with humanitarian pur-
pose,57 to the many victims of mental disorders genuinely causally related 
to work-stress. 
Other jurisdictions have taken varying positions with regard to men-
tal injuries caused by work-stress. The liberal position adopted by the 
Oalifornia and Michigan courts apparently presents no insuperable ob-
stacles to administration by their respective industrial commissions.58 
The Wisconsin courts have adopted a contrary position in order to meet 
the problem of providing humanitarian relief for worthy claimants while 
avoiding conversion of the compensation a.ct into general health insur-
ance. The Wisconsin courts have held that in order for non-traumatically 
caused mental injuries to be compens,able, the disorder must be causally 
related to' a working condition of stress greater than the everyday mental 
53 The leading article on the subject, frequently cited by later commentators, is 
Comment, Workmen's Compensation Awards for Psyc1wneurotic Reasons, 70 YALE 
L.J. 1129 (1961). An article reflecting the fear of unrestricted awards is Brill & 
Glass, Workmen's Compensation for PsychiatriC Disorders, 193 J.A.M.A. 345 (1965). 
An interesting casenote, placing an Illinois case in a nationwide context, is Reoovery 
for Nervous Iniury Resulting from Mental Stimulus under Workmen's Compensation 
Laws, CHI.-KENT L. REv. 731 (1977). The leading New York case, Wolfe v. 
Sibley, Lindsay & CUr! Go., 36 N.Y.2d 505, 330 N.E.2d 603 (1975), is discussed 
in 28 SYRACUSE L. REV. 690 (1977). See also 2A LARSON, supra note 47, § 42.21. 
54 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1759, 380 N.E.2d 1295. 
55 ld. at 1773, 380 N.E.2d at 1301. 
56 Id; at 1772, 380 N.E.2d at 1301. 
57 See Young v. Duncan, 218 Mass. 346,349,106 N.E. 1,3 (1914); Rurle's Case, 
217 Mass. 223, 226,104 N.E. 336, 338 (1914) ("in favor of a liberal interpretation 
of 'personal injuries' . . ."). 
58 Baker v. WQI'~n's Compensation Appeals Board, 18 Cal. App. 3d 852, 96 
Cal. Rptr. 279 (1971); Carter v. General Motors Corp., 361 Mich. 577, 106 N.W.2d 
105 (1960). 
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stress and pressure experienced by all employees. 59 The Maine court, 
in a recent well-reasoned decision,60 added another facet to the Wiscon-
sin rule. Noting that some susceptible workmen may succumb to the 
ordinary stress of everyday work and properly deserve compensation, the 
court would allow compensation if the cause of the injury is established 
by clear and convincing evidence.61 The elaborated rule was thus stated: 
In sum, where there is a sudden mental injury precipitated by a 
work-related event, our typical workers' compensation rules will gov-
ern. Where, however, the mental disability is the gradual result of 
work-related stresses, the claimant will have to demonstrate either 
that he has been subjected to greater pressures and tensions than 
those experienced by the average employee or, alternatively, by clear 
and convincing evidence show that the ordinary and umal work-
related pressures predominated in producing the injury.62 
Thus, these jurisdictions have, in varying degrees, permitted compensa-
tion for mental injuries attributable to work-stress. 
The law relative to mental or emotional disorders caused by mental or 
emotional work stress will undoubtedly be the subject of considerable 
development in the near future. It is desirable that the principles of 
broad construction, which have dominated judiCial interpretation of the 
Massachusetts compensation act, will be applied in this field. It is hoped 
that the trend reflected in Fitzgibbons' Case and Albanese's Case will 
be implemented to fashion a rule establishing the compensability of 
mental disorders causally related to cumulative work-related stress where 
there is evidence sufficient to satisfy the Industrial Accident Board in 
the course of the adversary process. 
§6.2. Arising Out of and In the Course of Employment-Travel as 
an Essential Part of Employment by a Temporary Help Agency-Auto-
mobile Accident During Weekend Travel to Visit Family. During the 
Survey year the Appeals Court in Swasey's Case 1 considered whether an 
injury sustained by an employee of a temporary help agency while driv-
ing home to spend the weekend with his family arose out of and in the 
course of his employment.2 Lehigh Design Company, Inc., located in 
Waltham, Mass., operated a business which supplied engineering per-
59 Swiss Colony v. Department of ILHR, 72 Wis. 2d 46, 51, 240 N.W.2d 128, 
130 (1976); Sohool District No.1 v. Deparbnent of ILHR, 62 Wis. 2d 370, 377-78, 
215 N.W.2d 373, 377 (1974). 
60 Townsend v. Maine Bureau of Public Safety, 404 A.2d 1014 (Me. 1979). 
61 ld. at 1020. 
621d. 
§6.2. 1 Swasey's Case, 1979 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. 2032, 395 N.E.2d 884, 
21d. 
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sonnel to their clients, companies which needed such engineering serv-
ices.3 In 1965 Swasey, an engineering aide, was interviewed by Lehigh 
for a project of International Business Machines Corporation (IBM) in 
Poughkeepsie, N.Y.4 Lehigh told Swasey that he would receive an addi-
tional per diem allowance to cover some of his expenses of travel between 
his home in Arlington, Mass. and Poughkeepsie and the cost of living 
away from home.5 On this basis Swasey accepted the position.6 He 
took a room in Poughkeepsie where he cooked his meals on a hot plate, 
and on weekends he returned to his home in Arlington.7 One Friday, he 
left for Arlington by his own car about 10:30 p.m.8 While driving through 
Westfield, Mass., about 1:00 a.m., he went off the road, hit a tree, and 
sustained serious injuries. 9 After a brief hospitalization and six months 
more out of work, he returned to IBM on cmtches.lO He managed to 
continue working ,there and on other jobs until he was finally forced by 
his injury to stop work in 1972.11 
Swasey then filed a claim for compensation benefits.12 A single mem-
ber of the Industrial Accident Board allowed his claim, finding inter alia 
that the per diem allowance was a term of Swasey's employment contract 
and ruling that his injury arose out of and in the course of his employ-
ment.13 The reviewing board affirmed the decision.14 On appeal, the 
superior court reversed and dismissed the claim, ruling that the findings 
were not warranted by the evidence.15 On the employee's appeal, the 
Appeals Court reversed the judgment of the superior court. The court 
held that when viewed in its entirety, it was the employment that "im-
pell~d the employee to make the trip," 16 thus rendering the risk of the 
8 ld. at 2033, 395 'N.E.2d at 885. Lehigh hired the people and assigned them 
to companies, paid their wages, made the necessary deduotions for state and federal 
taxes and social security benefits, and provided worker's compensation insurance. ld. 
4 ld. 
5 la.. Swasey had objected that the original salary offered would not cover these 
expenses. Lehigh agreed to pay Swasey an additional per diem of $1.25 per hour 
up to 40 hours to cover travel expenses or food and lodging, or both, as he should 
choose. ld. 
6 ld. 
7 ld. at 2034, 395 N.E.2d at 883. 
8 ld. at 2034, 395 N.E.2d at 886. The accident occurred on October 30, 1965. ld. 
9 ld. 
10 ld. 
n ld. at 2035, 395 N.E.2d at 886. 
12 ld. "An injury arises out of the employment if it arises out of the nature, 
conditions, obligations, or incidents of the employment; in other words, out of the 
employment looked at in any of its aspect." Caswell's Case., 305 Mass. 500, 502, 26 
N.E.2d 328, 330 (1940). lr 1979 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 2035, 395 N.E.2d at 883. 
11' ld. 
15 ld. at 2032, 395 N.E.2dat 885. 
16 ld. at 2037, 395 N.E.2d at 887, quoting Carson's Case, 351 Mass. 406, 409, 
2211 N.E.2d 871, 874 (1964). 
9
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trip a hazard of that employment,17 It ruled that the "going and coming" 
rule had no application to the case because the employee came within 
"that class of 'travelling workers' not barred from receiving compensa-
tion." 18 
The chief issue presented in Swasey's Case was whether the injury 
arouse out of and in the course of employment.19 Chapter 152, section 
26, of the Geneml Laws entitles an employee to benefits when he suffers 
an injury "arising out of and in the course of his employment, or arising 
out of an ordinary risk of the street while actually engaged, with his 
employer'S authorization, in the business affairs or undertakings of his 
employer .... " 20 The insurer contended that Swasey did not fall within 
the street risk clause, as he was not "actually engaged" in his employer's 
business at the moment of injury.21 Similarly, the insurer argued that 
because Swasey was injured while on his way home to visit his family, 
he is precluded from being compensated by the "going and coming" 
rule, which states that an employee injured on his way to or from work 
is not entitled to compensation.22 
The court first disposed of the "going and coming" rule argument by 
observing that when his employment was viewed in its entirety, Swasey 
was a "travelling worker." 23 Travelling workers do not come within the 
scope of the "going and coming" rule which is limited to persons with a 
fixed place of employment and fixed hours.24 When going or coming 
from the employment, workers are protected only when on the employ-
ment premises.25 
The court then considered the nature of Swasey's employment. It 
noted that Swasey was specifically hired by Lehigh as an engineering 
aide who would be aSSigned and sent to work on projects in distant loca-
tions.26 Swasey was to continue with each project until its completion.27 
The court also noted that it was important to the success of Lehigh's 
17 1979 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 2037, 395 N.E.2d at 887. 
18 [d., quoting Wormstead v. Town Manager of Saugus, 366 Mass. 659, 667, 322 
N.E.2d 171, 176 (1975). 
19 1979 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 2042, 395 N.E.2d at 886. 
20 G.L. c. 152, § 26, as amended by Acts of 1973, c. 855, § 1. 
21 1979 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 2038, 395 N.E.2d at 887. 
22 [d. at 2036, 395 N.E.2d at 886. For a discussion of the "going and corning" 
rule, see 29 MASSACHUSETTS PRACTICE, LOCKE, WORKMEN'S CoMPENSATION §§ 262-
265 (2d ed. 1974). 
23 1979 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 2.037, 395 N.E.2d at 887. 
24 LOCKE, supra note 2.2, §§ 262, 310-311. 
25 Gwaltney's Case, 355 Mass. 333, 2.44 N.E.2d 314 (1969). This case provides 
a good general review of the rule. 
26 1979 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 2037, 395 N.E.2d at 887. 
27 [d. 
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business that its employees travel. 28 The court did not base its conclu-
sion narrowly on the per diem, but used the per diem to demonstrate 
that Lehigh understood that travel and living temporarily away from 
home was an essential part of its business.29 This analysis supported 
compensation on general principles of "arising out of and in the course 
of employment" and on the "street risk" amendment. 30 The court stated 
that "Swasey . . . was injured while engaged in an activity which con-
stituted a critical and substantial incident of his employment . . . ." 31 
The court concluded, therefore, that Swasey's injury arose out of a risk 
of the street while he engaged in the undertakings of his employment.32 
The court's holding in Swasey's Case is well supported by precedent. 
Had Swasey been injured in his rooming house, rather than on his way 
home for the weekend, he would have come within the landmark deci-
sion of Souza's Case 33 which was the basis of the "actual risk" doctrine. 
Consideration of whether the employment impelled the trip brought the 
case within the oft-cited Caron's Case,34 which held that where the 
employment impels the employee to make the trip, the risk of the trip 
is a hazard of employment.35 
In basing its decision on the principle of "arising out of and in the 
course of employment," the Swasey court once again provided a rational 
construction of the compensation act. Instead of focusing on a series of 
narrow fact-oriented rules, the court gave a basic interpretation of the 
broad language and purpose of the act.36 The Swasey decision broadens 
the protection afforded employees of temporary help agencies, the nature 
of whose employment is such that travel is "a critical and substantial 
incident" of the employment. 37 The rationale of the decision is not lim-
ited to employees of temporary help agencies, nor to injuries during 
28 ld. 
29 ld. at 2037-38, 395 N.E.2d at 387. 
30 ld. at 2038, 395 N.E.2d at 887. 
31 ld. 
321d. 
33 326 Mass. 332, 55 N.E.2d 611 (1944) (traveling repairman killed by fire in 
rooming house where he slept while working away from home on assignment). 
34 351 Mass. 406, 221 N.E.2d 871 (1966) (returning home at night from a 
company dinner). 
35 ld. at 409, 221 N.E.2d at 874. The decision of the Swasey court enabled it to 
avoid conSidering whether the trip was an exception to the "going and coming" rule. 
The employee had argued, as a second line of defense, that the award granted by 
the board should be sustained according to a line of cases in other jurisdictions 
dealing with travelling workers engaged in paid travel to distant worksites. 1979 
Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 2036, 395 N.E.2d at 886-87. 
36 Another outstanding example of this approach to compensation appeals is 
D'Angeli's Case, 369 Mass. 812, 343 N.E.2d 368 (1976). 
37 1979 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 2038, 395 N.E.2d at 887. 
11
Locke: Chapter 6: Workmen's Compensation
Published by Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School, 1979
190 1979 ANNUAL SURVEY OF MASSACHUSETTS LAW §6.3 
travel. Rather, it is based broadly on the essential meaning of the term 
"arising out of ,and in the course of employment." 38 
§6.3. Rights of Employees of Non-Insured Employers-Negligence 
Action Against Corporate Officer for Failure to Provide Compensation 
Insurance. The Massachusetts \Vorkmen's Compensation Act is com-
pulsory for all employees in private employment, with the sole exception 
of seasonal or casual or part-time domestic servants for whom there is 
elective coverage.1 Every employer for whom the act is compulsory 
must pay to his employees the compensation provided by the act.2 The 
employer may provide for these payments by (1) insurance with an 
insurer, or (2) qualifying as a self-insurer. 3 The employer's obligation 
to comply with the requirement of coverage is enforced by a statutory 
fine of not more than $500 and imprisonment for not more than one 
year.4 More importantly, where an employer fails to provide coverage 
and an incident ensues, the employer may be sued in a civil action for 
the full scope of tort damages.5 In such an action the employer cannot 
raise the usual common law defenses of fellow servant, assumption of 
the risk, and contributory negligence.6 Furthermore, the employee has 
only to show that the injury arose out of and in the course of employ-
ment. The employee does not have to establish fault on the part of the 
employer.7 
Two cases decided during the Survey year dealt with the problem 
of recovery of damages against a non-insured employer. In Samagais 
v. Davidson,8 the Appeals Court upheld a determination of the superior 
court that as a matter of law the employer was not insured on the date 
of the injury.9 The superior court found that the compensation insur-
ance had been effectively cancelled before that date and had not been 
reinstated by any actions thereafter. IO The case is of interest primarily 
for the facts illustrating the maneuvers of the employer to avoid the 
finding that he was not insured. 
38 ld. at 2037, 395 N.E.2d at 887. 
§6.3. 1 C.L. c. 152, § 1 (4); MASSACHUSETTS PRACTICE, LOCKE, WORKMEN'S 
COMPENSATION § 101 (2d ed. 1974). 
2 C.L. c. 152, § 25C. 
3 C.L. c. 152, § 25A. 
4 C.L. c. 152, § 25C. 
5 C.L. c. 152, §§ 66, 67. 
61d. 
7 Id. 
8 1979 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. 4, 384 N.E.2d 210. 
9 Id. at 6, 384 N.E.2d at 212. 
10Id. 
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In the second case, LaClair v. Silverline Manufacturing Co., Inc.,H 
the Supreme Judicial Court held that a principal corporate officer could 
be found personally liable for his negligence in failing to provide work-
men's compensation coverage.12 
Joseph W. LaClair was a supervisor in charge of plant production 
for Marian Plastics, Inc., a small company in the business of manufactur-
ing and coloring plastics.13 He was severely burned when an explosion 
and fire occurred at his employer's factory, and he died nine days later.14 
At the time, Marian Plastics was substantially in debt and had neither fire 
nor workmen's compensation insurance.15 A number of actions were 
brought, including an action against the corporation under chapter 152, 
sections 66 and 67, which resulted in a verdict in the plaintiff's favor. 16 
A separate action was brought against Robert E. Lewis, the president, 
treasurer, sole stockholder, and day-to-day manager of the company 
business, alleging that he negligently failed to obtain workmen's com-
pensation insurance in behalf of his employeesP At the close of the 
evidence, the judge allowed a motion for a directed verdict against the 
plaintiff. 18 On appeal, the Supreme Judicial Court reversed, concluding 
that the evidence presented at trial was sufficient for a jury to find that 
Lewis was negligent in failing to obtain workmen's compensation in-
surance.19 The Court remanded the cause of action for retriapo 
The Court's line of reasoning is clear. After recapitulating the em-
ployer'S obligation to provide for payment of compensation and the civil 
and criminal penalties for noncompliance, Chief Justice Hennessey 
stated: "What .these statutory provisions reveal ... is that the Work-
men's Compensation Act is a humanitarian measure designed to provide 
adequate financial protection to the victims of industrial accidents." 21 
The Court noted that without such insurance, many injured employees 
and their families would personally have to pay large portions of the 
costs of job-related accidents.22 Workmen's compensation provides the 
employee and his family with a limited but substantial right to be in-
11 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2228, 393 N.E.2d 867. 
12 ld. at 2229-30, 393 N.E.2d at 869. 
13 ld. at 2230, 393 N.E.2d at 869. 
14 ld. 
15 ld. at 2236, 393 N.E.2d at 871. 
16 ld. at 2229, 393 N.E.2d at 869. 
17 ld. at 2231, 393 N.E.2d at 869. 
18 ld. at 2229, 393 N.E.2d at 869. 
19 ld. at 2229-30, 393 N.E.2d at 869. 
20 ld. at 2230, 393 N.E.2d at 869. 
21 ld. at 2234, 393 N.E.2d at 871. 
22 ld. at 2234-35, 393 N.E.2d at 871. 
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sured against the serious financial costs that result from job related 
injuries. 23 
The Court emphasized that its decision was based upon ordinary 
negligence principles.24 In determining whether Lewis was negligent 
the Court applied the same test that is used in all negligence cases-
"how a person of ordinary prudence would act in similar circum-
stances." 25 The Court ruled that there was sufficient evidence to sub-
mit to ,the jury the question of whether Lewis was negligent in failing 
to proVide workmen's compensation coverage.26 The Court noted that 
Lewis, as corporate president and treasurer, was subject to criminal 
sanctions for his firm's failure to obtain workmen's compensation insur-
ance.27 According to the Court, while this violation of the safety statute 
or like enactment was not conclusive evidence, it was evidence of the 
violator's negligence as to all consequences the statute sought to avoid.28 
The Court also found that .Lewis was well aware of his company's pre-
carious financial condition.20 Thus, the Court reasoned that Lewis 
should have known that an employee's attempt to satisfy a personal 
injury claim against the corporation from the company's assets would 
probably be futile.30 In addition, the Court noted that Lewis knew of 
the company's use of extremely volatile chemicals and of the company's 
poor safety precautions.31 From these facts it could be inferred that 
Lewis knew or should have known that there was a significantprob-
ability of industrial accidents during the production process.32 The 
Court concluded that from this evidence a jury could find that Lewis's 
failure to obtain compensation insurance was negligent.ss 
Addressing the issue of damages, the Court held that damages would 
be limited to the amount of recovery that the claimant would have been 
otherwise entitled to receive under chapter 152.34 The Court observed 
2S ld. at 2235, 393 N.E.2d at 871. 
24 ld. 
211 ld. 
26 ld,. 
27 ld. 
28 ld. at 2235-36, 393 N.E.2d at 871. 
29 ld. at 2236, 393 N.E.2d at 871. 
30 ld. Although the opinion is silent on this point, it is a reasonable inference that 
the judgment against the corporation was essentially uncollectible. 
31 ld. 
32 ld. The Court also held that Lewis would not be immune from personal 
liability for his failure to obtain workmen's compensation coverage, because this 
failure occurred while performing corporate business. The Court stated that a 
corporate officer is liable for those torts in which he has personally participated, 
whether or not he is acting within the scope of his authority. ld. 
3S ld. at 2235, 393 N.E.2d at 871-72. 
34 ld. at 2238, 393 N.E.2d at 872. 
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that no greater sum would be warranted given the absence of a statute 
establishing the measure of damages.3~ In so stating the Court invited 
comparison of this case with actions brought under section 66,36 which 
are characterized as actions to recover damages for personal injury. 
Tfie Court apparently meant to distinguish the present case from actions 
carrying with them a statutory measure of damages, particularly the 
usual damages in a personal injury action. The Court seems unneces-
sarily narrow in so limiting damages, particularly after having excori-
ated the defendant's conduct in tenns that would have seemed to 
warrant even punitive damages. 
In assessing damages on retrial the jury should consider all the ele-
ments entering into a compensation award. These elements would in-
clude benefits for widows and dependent children, funeral benefits, and 
medical and hospital benefits. There are two additional elements of 
damages that should be considered along with the other benefits in 
assessing the amount of compensation that would have been obtained 
from workmen's compensation. One such damage is the specific losses 
allowed under section 36, which survive to the dependent widow by 
virtue of section 36A.37 The other is the series of additional costs and 
fees provided by the compensation act for unreasonable delay in pay-
ment. 38 If the plaintiff is going to be limited to the compensation act 
as a measure of damages, at the very least she should be entitled to the 
benefit of all the provisions of the compensation act, as a properly 
instructed jury might see fit to allow. 
The Court concluded its discussion of the corporate officer's liability 
by expressing its hopes "that the self-interest of employers, their officers, 
and agents will lead them all to consistent compliance with c. 152, and, 
in turn, to a reduction in uncompensated industrial accidents." 39 Recog-
nizing that self-interest might not invariably lead to such a course of 
action, the Supreme Judicial Court in LaClair has added an important 
new weapon to the arsenal of rights of an employee of an uninsured 
employer. Nevertheless, more than a private remedy is needed. A 
state fund is required to provide compensation for the injured worker 
where the employer has failed to meet his statutory obligation. Under 
such a scheme, it would be the responsibility of the state, rather than 
the employee, to pursue the elusive defaulting employer. Bills to create 
such a fund have been submitted to the General Court for the past 
35 [d. 
36 [d. 
37 See, e.g., Bagge's Case, 369 Mass. 129, 338 N.E.2d 348 (1975). 
38 C.L. c. 152, §§ 12A, 14 & 51A. 
39 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2238, 393 N.E.2d at 872. 
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several years but have failed of passage. The commonwealth, which 
requires compulsory compensation, should stand behind its own standard 
and protect those whom the employer fails to insure. 
§6.4. Unemployment Bene6ts-Bar to Receipt of Workmen's Com-
pensation Payments-Exception for Workers Sustaining Injuries Spec-
i6ed Under Chapter 152, Section 36. Ordinarily, an employee may not 
receive both the benefits for unemployment under chapter l5lA, the 
Employment Security Act, and the total or partial incapacity compensa-
tion under chapter 152, the Workmen's Compensation Act.1 Although 
the Employment Security Act and the Workmen's Compensation Act 
address different hazards,2 there may be occasions when an employee 
is out of work as a result of both.3 N a provision in the compensation 
act deals with this situation, but the Employment Security Act bars an 
employee who "is receiving or has received or is about to receive com-
pensation for partial or total disability" under workmen's compensation 
from receiving unemployment bene6ts.4 In Pierce's Case 5 the converse 
of the prohibition of chapter l5lA, section 25( d), was applied to bar 
an employee who had received unemployment bene6ts from receiving 
incapacity compensation for an overlapping period.6 In Gallant's Case 7 
the Court held that the Industrial Accident Board did not have the 
power to prevent insurance companies from receiving a windfall by 
ordering an insurer to reimburse the Division of Employment Security.s 
An exception to this rule has been made for employees suffering from 
injuries specified in chapter 152, section 36, of the compensation act.9 
This exception was based on a similar exception in clause (3) of sub-
paragraph (d) of chapter l5lA. In dictum in Pierces' Case the Supreme 
Judicial Court noted that the legislature had also recognized that an 
exception should be made in cases where a workman suffers partial in-
capacity due to any of the injuries listed in section 36.10 The Court 
observed that in such instances it may be assumed that "the workman 
would not only suffer a diminution of his earning capacity due directly 
to his injury but would be further handicapped in securing employment 
§6.4. 1 Pierce's Case, 325 Mass. 649, 92 N.E.2d 245 (1950). 
2 ld. at 656, 92 N.E.2d at 250. 
3 For example, an injured employee may continue to work despite his pain and 
handicap until he is laid off. Such an employee with a permanent handicap is un-
able, following a layoff, to find work suited to his limited capability. 
4 C.L. c. 151A, § 25(d). 
5 325 Mass. 649, 92 N.E.2d 245 (1950). 
6 ld. at 657, 92 N.E.2d at 250-51. 
7329 Mass. 607, 109 N.E.2d 829 (1953). 
sId. at 609-10, 109 N.E.2d at 830. 
9 C.L. c. 152, § 36. 
10 325 Mass. at 655, 92 N.E.2d at 249. 
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during a period of business depression due to his visible maimed or 
crippled physical condition and so his inability to earn might in part 
at least be due to the economic situation." 11 This dictum, although 
singled out and highlighted in by this author,12 remained largely ignored. 
The Court in Pierce's Case assumed that the legislature intended to 
allow unemployment compensation only when an employee actually had 
received payments for specific compensation under section 36 rather 
than allow it whenever an employee was suffering from an injury suffi-
ciently severe to be specified under section 36.13 During the Survey 
year the Appeals Court in Rival's Case 14 confirmed the validity of the 
dictum of Pierce's Case. 
In Rival's Case, an employee who had incurred an industrial injury 
in 1967, resulting in loss of his right arm, was subsequently employed 
on a seasonal basis in a job created for him.15 For about four months 
every winter he was laid off from his job owing to the seasonal nature 
of his work and his inability to perform the other work previously 
assigned to him during the winter months.16 During these months he 
applied for and received unemployment benefits under chapter 151A.17 
He then applied for partial incapacity compensation under chapter 152, 
section 35, up to the amount of his former weekly wage. IS He was 
denied such compensation by the review board.19 On appeal to the 
superior court, the court entered a judgment affirming the review board's 
decision.2o The judge reported a question of law to the Supreme Judi-
cial Court, which referred the question to the Appeals Court.21 
The Appeals Court held that an employee who has incurred an injury 
specified in chapter 152, section 36, and who has received unemploy-
ment benefits under chapter 151A may ·also receive partial incapacity 
compensation under chapter 152, section 35, up to the amount of his 
11 ld. 
12 29 MASSACHUSETTS PRACTICE, LOCKE, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 616, at 
731 n.39 (2d ed. 1974). 
13 325 Mass. at 656, 92 N.E.2d at 250. 
14 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1429, 391 N.E.2d 932. 
15 ld. at 1430, 391 N.E.2d at 933. 
161d. 
17 ld. 
18 ld. 
19 ld. 
20 ld. at 1430-31, 391 N.E.2d at 933. 
21 ld. at 1431, 391 N.E.2d at 933. As a matter of procedure, under c. 152, § 11, 
the superior court justice must enter a judgment on the case before him, before he 
has the, power to report a question of law. The court in Pierce's Case was con-
fronted with a report without a decree and discharged the case. It nevertheless 
addressed the merits of the case because of the importance of the issue. ld. at 1431 
n.4, 391 N.E.2d at 133 n.4. 
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average wage prior to the injury.22 The court's decision was based on 
the exception contained in chapter 151A, section 25( d) .23 While this 
section disqualifies persons from receiving unemployment benefits for 
a period for which they are receiving or about to receive compensation 
for partial or total disability, it does not include payments for those 
injuries specified under chapter 152, section 36.24 The court then 
noted the dictum in Pierce's Case. 25 The insurer had argued that the 
construction in Pierce's Case was contrary to the intent of the legislature 
which, the insurer claimed, was to permit only payments made under 
chapter 152, section 36.26 In response to the insurer's argument the 
court noted "that the Legislature has amended c. 151A, §25, numerous 
times since the opinion in Pierce was issued in 1950, but has left the 
portion §25(d) construed in Pierce unchanged. It must be presumed, 
therefore, that the Legislature has adopted the construction of the statute 
given it in Pierce's Case." 27 The provisions of chapter 152, section 36, 
have been amended frequently since the. decision in Pierce in 1950, and 
section 36 now encompasses a broader range of handicaps than the 
section construed in Pierce.28 The insurer sought to draw comfort from 
this fact. 29 The Rival court, however, firmly stated that "[t]he fact that 
G.L. c. 152, §36, has been amended. to include many more types of 
injuries does not render the court's construction in Pierce invalid, since it 
was c. 151A, §25(d), and not c. 152, §36, which the court construed in 
Pierce." 30 
No question of double benefits is raised by the allowance of partial 
compensation. Under section 35 the most that an employee can receive 
is his former average weekly wage.S1 The Court quotes this author, 
who has suggested that "the Board will usually set the employee's earn-
ing capacity at an amount equal to or above the unemployment bene-
fit." 32 In this case, the Court noted, the combination of unemployment 
benefits and partial incapacity benefits would merely bring the em-
ployee's income up to his average weekly wage before the injury 
occurred.33 
22 Id. 
23 Id. 
24 C.L. c. 151A, § 25( d). 
25 1979 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 1431, 391 N.E.2d at 933. 
26 Id. at 1432, 391 N.E.2d at 934. 
27 Id. 
28 The principal amendments are contained in the Acts of 1949, c. 519, Acts of 
1966, c. 584, and Acts of 1972, c. 741. 
29 1979 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 1432, 391 N.E.2d at 934. 
30 Id. at 1432-33,391 N.E.2d at 934. 
31 Id. at 1434, 391 N.E.2d at 934-35. 
32 Id. at 1433, 391 N.E.2d at 934, quoting LocKE, supra note. 12, § 616, at 731-32. 
33 1979 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 1434,391 N.E.2d at 935. 
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The decision is a strong reminder to the Industrial Accident Board 
and to insurers that the beneficient provisions of the Legislature and 
the liberal construction of the appellate courts are not to be lightly set 
aside. It is an equally strong reminder to employees' counsel that they 
have a duty to insist on the enforcement of these provisions. 
§6.5. Second Injury Fund-Retroactive Application of an Amend-
ment to the Statute. An insurer is required to pay a disabled employee 
compensation for the combined effects of his industrial injury and any 
pre-existing infirmity, whether congenital or traumatic.! The legislature 
in 1919 enacted what is known as the Second Injury Fund 2 as a means 
of encouraging the employment of the handicapped. The intention of 
the legislature was to relieve the employer or the insurer from the bur-
den of paying full compensation for the further disability of an employee 
whose previous injury combined with one subsequently incurred in the 
course of employment.3 The original fund was markedly limited in its 
coverage, applying only to employees who had certain specified injuries, 
resulting from a personal injury. It was amended in 1950 to apply to 
specific injuries, whether the impairment is the result of a personal injury 
or a congenital defect.4 After 1950, however, the statute still applied 
only to employees with the identified specific injuries. It was no aid to 
the great mass of handicapped workers suffering from back injuries or 
heart attacks or those affected by epilepsy, central nervous system dis-
eases, muscular dystrophy, or other medical conditions,. Such workers 
had a great problem in securing work, although fully able to give valu-
able service in selected occupations.5 
Over a period of years a series of bills were introduced in the legisla-
ture by organizations interested in the employment of the handicapped, 
although none achieved passage until 1973. In 1962, a special commis-
sion dealing with the problems of rehabilitation, employment, or re-em-
ployment of handicapped or disabled work persons recommended passage 
of a broader Second Injury Fund. G Similar legislation was introduced 
in successive years.' The Acts of 1973, chapter 855, section 2, amended 
the Second Injury Fund by extending its coverage to all types of physical 
§6.5. ! Franconnier's Case, 223 Mass. 273, 111 N.E. 792 (1916); 29 MASSACHU-
SETTS PRACTICE, LOCKE, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 308 (2d ed. 1974). 
2 Acts of 1919, c. 272, §§ 1 & 2. 
3 McLean's Case, 326 Mass. 72, 74, 93 N.E.2d 233, 235 (1950). 
4 Acts of 1950, c. 527, to overcome the decision in McLean's Case, supra note 3, 
that personal injury did not include a congenital defect. 
5 LOCKE, supra note 1, § 309, at 375. 
6 House Doc. 3420 (1962). 
7 American Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. v. Commonwealth, 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2685, 
2690 n.11, 398 N.E.2d 491, 496 n.11. 
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impairment. The Fund would reimburse an insurer for up to fifty percent 
(50%) of any compensation paid subsequent to the first one hundred four 
( 104) weeks of disability, where an employee with a known physical 
impairment sustained a compensable injury resulting in disability greater 
than that which would have resulted from the injury alone.8 
The 1973 statute contained no special section limiting its application 
to injuries arising on or after its effective date, December 31, 1973. Con-
siderable questions therefore arose, in the administration of the 1973 
amendment, concerning the application of the amendment to injuries 
occurring before its effective date. In American Mutual Liability Insur-
ance Co. v. Commonwealth,fJ decided at the end of the Survey year, the 
Supreme Judicial Court held that the amendment had application to all 
injuries, whether arising before or after the effective date of the amend-
ment.10 The Court found that a speCial provision of the compensation 
act, chapter 152, section 2A, controlled. I 1 The Court ruled that inasmuch 
as the 1973 amendment did not increase the amount of compensation 
payable to an employee or his dependents, the amendment had retroac-
tive effect.12 
The traditional rule is that statutes dealing with substantive rights are 
to be construed to deal only with transactions occurring after their enact-
ment, unless legislative intent that they should be applied to past transac-
tions is clearly expressed.13 By the same rule, statutes that deal with 
procedural or remedial matters apply to all pending cases. For the pur-
poses of the compensation act, however, whether an amendment applies 
retroactively or not is governed by a special provision of the General 
Laws, chapter 152, section 2A.14 This provision states that every act in 
amendment of the compensation act that increases the amount of com-
pensation payable to an injured employee or his dependents is deemed 
to be substantive in character and to apply only to personal injuries 
occurring on or after the effective date of such act, unless otherwise 
expressly provided.15 All other acts are deemed to be procedural or 
remedial only and to apply to "personal injury irrespective of the date of 
their occurrence, unless otherwise expressly prOVided." 16 The test of ret-
8 C.L. c. 152, § 37. 
fJ 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2685, 398 N.E.2d 491. 
10 [d. at 2686, 398 N.E.2d at 493. 
11 [d. 
12 [d. at 2692, 398 N.E.2d at 496. 
13 Hanscom v. Malden & Melrose Cas Light Co., 220 Mass. 1 3 107 N.E. 426, 
427 (1914). ' , 
14 C.L. c. 152, § 2A, added by Acts of 1946, c. 386, § 3. 
15 [d. 
16 [d. 
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roactivity under section 2A is thus considerably broader than the tradi-
tional rule. It establishes a legislative policy that all amendments other 
than those increasing the amount of compensation payable to an injured 
employee or his dependents shall apply to pending claims. Thus, an 
amendment increasing the rate of interest was held applicable to injuries 
befoTe its effeotive date, as interest was held not to be "compensation" 
within the meaning of this section. 1. Acts creating the presumption of 
compensability under .chapter 152, section 7 A,18 and abolishing the pre-
sumption of permanent and total disability for speCified handicaps 19 were 
also held to apply retroactively. 
In the instant case, American Mutual Liability Insurance Co. v. Com-
monwealth, the Court found this provision applicable to the 1973 Second 
Injury Fund.20 The commonwealth, in its capacity as custodian of the 
Second Injury Fund, argued that the case resembled Price v. Railway 
Express Agency, Inc.,21 where an amendment extending the coverage of 
the act to a group of employees previously excluded was construed to 
extend coverage only to injuries after its effective date.22 The Court 
distinguished Price, stating that the Court had denied retroactive applica-
tion of section 2A in that case, because such application would have 
resulted in an increase in the amount of compensation to be paid by the 
employer.23 Such an increase was considered contrary to section 2A's 
purpose, which was to limit the compensation to the amount fixed at the 
time of injury and to avoid placing an additional burden on the employer 
by increasing the compensation.24 The Court noted that in the present 
case a retroactive application of amended section 37 would lead neither 
to an increase in any existing compensation obligation nor to the creation 
of new employee claims for compensation.25 The only increased burden 
would fall on the commonwealth in making payment under the Second 
Injury Fund.26 The Court observed that if the legislature so desired, it 
had the power to place additional burdens on the Second Injury Fund.27 
The Court then added that "where a State enacts retroactive legislation 
impairing its own rights, it cannot be heard to complain . . . ." 28 
17 Murphy's Case, 352 Mass. 233, 235, 224 N.E.2d 462, 464 (1967). 
18 Goddu's Case, 323 Mass. 397, 400, 82 N.E.2d 232, 234 (1948). 
19 Khachadoorian's Case, 329 Mass. 625, 629, 110 N.E.2d 115, 117 (1953). 
20 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2686, 398 N.E.2d at 493. 
21 322 Mass. 476, 78 N.E.2d 13 (1948). 
22 Id. at 484, 78 N.E.2d at 19. 
23 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2692, 398 N.E.2d at 496. 
24 Id. 
25 Id. 
26Id. 
27 Id. at 2692, 398 N.E.2d at 496. 
28 Id., quoting Greenway's Case, 319 Mass. 121, 123, 65 N.E.2d 16, 18 (1946). 
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In the course of its decision~ the Court reviewed the history of the 
Second Injury Fund.29 Citing legislative efforts to broaden the Second 
Injury Fund to effectuate the Fund's underlying purpose, the Court 
emphasized that the legislative purpose was the encouragement of the 
hiring and continued employment of handicapped or previously injured 
workers.30 In response to the commonwealth's argument that retroactive 
application of the act could not affect the hiring of anyone in the past,31 
the Court relied on the terminology used in section 37,32 the third para-
graph of which speaks of "retention in employment." 33 The Court 
viewed these words as indicating that the act was to apply to employees 
who were hired before or after the effective date of the act. 34 
In response to various contentions raised by the commonwealth, the 
Court made several interesting observations concerning statutory con-
struction For example, the commonwealth had contended that the 
Second Injury Fund would be inadequate to provide reimbursement for 
all the claims that would arise if the amendment to section 37 were 
applied retroactively.35 The Court observed that while such arguments 
concerning hardship may be appropriate respecting the enactment of 
legislation, they "are not controlling in the interpretation of existing 
statutes." 36 In response to the commonwealth's argument that a retro-
active application of the amendment would not accomplish the legisla-
tive purpose,37 the Court observed that it was for the legislature to 
determine what means would best effectuate its purpose.38 The Court 
also noted that if the legislature had wanted to limit the operation of 
the amended section 37 to cases arising subsequent to the effective date, 
it could have done so expressly.39 
The decision of the Court is a clear-cut resolution of a previously con-
fusing and controversial problem. The Court did not base its decision 
on the fact that the insurer's right to reimbursement arose after the effec-
tive date of the amendment or that its petition for reimbursement had 
been filed after the effective date of the amendment.4o Instead, it faced 
the issue squarely. Similarly, the Court did not place any limit on cases 
29 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2690 n.ll, 398 N.E.2d at 495 n.ll. 
30 ld. at 2690, 398 N.E.2d at 495. 
31 ld. at 2693, 398 N.E.2d at 496. 
32 ld. at 2693 n.13, 398 N.E.2d at 497 n.13. 
33 G.L. c. 152, § 37. 
34 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2693 n.13, 398 N.E.2d at 497 n.13. 
35 ld. at 2694, 398 N.E.2d at 497. 
36 ld. 
37 ld. at 2692-93, 398 N.E.2d at 496. 
38 ld. at 2693, 398 N.E.2d at 496-97. 
39 ld. 
40 ld. at 2687 n.4, 398 N.E.2d at 494 n.4. 
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coming within the retroactive application of the amendment. While 
practitioners may question how far back the insurer can reach to seek 
reimbursement or question the effect of a prior lump sum settlement, the 
Court has placed no limit upon the retroactive application of the amend-
ment. 
The only limitation will be the insurer's self-restraint. Insurers know 
that if funds prove insufficient the legislature has provided for such 
inadequacy by empowering the chairperson of the Industrial Accident 
Board to levy additional assessments upon insurers and self-insurers in 
the event that payments from the Fund exceed deposits in any given 
year.41 Consequently, insurers may well be moved to limit their applica-
tions knowing that they would stimulate such an assessment. On the 
other hand, the self-restraint of some insurers may be matched by the 
greed of others. Only time can tell what the pragmatic effect of the 
decision will be. 
41 G.L. c. 152, § 65. 
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